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The Liquidity Crisis, Investor Sentiment, and REIT Returns and Volatility 
Abstract 
The real estate investment trust (REIT) industry experienced a liquidity crisis resulting from 
reduced access to credit commitments as banks were restoring their balance sheets during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. Employing generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) models we examine the impact of the liquidity crisis and investor sentiment on REIT 
returns and volatility over the sample period from December 2001 to February 2013. We find that 
the liquidity crisis negatively impacts REIT returns and helps explain increases in volatility; this 
finding is robust to multiple specifications. We show that investor sentiment is a significant factor 
in explaining the REIT return generating process with institutional sentiment playing a dominating 
role over individual sentiment; furthermore, institutional sentiment was the only relevant sentiment 
variable during liquidity crisis.  
 
Keywords: Investor Sentiment, Liquidity Crisis, REIT returns, REIT volatility, GARCH-M 
JEL Classification Codes: G11, G14, G23 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the recession that accompanied it are catalogued as 
the worst economic downturn in U.S. history since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 
causes that prompted the crisis remain under debate; however, a large consensus points to lenient 
mortgage loan underwriting, aggressive lending practices by financial institutions, financial 
innovation through the creation of new funding products, historically low interest rates, and lax 
credit markets. The aggressive lending behavior led to the origination of subprime loans, which 
together with the real estate mortgage-backed securities market, contributed to the boom and 
subsequent bust of the housing bubble and the crash of the financial system. The U.S. Treasury 
Office of Financial Stability recognizes that for the first time in 80 years, the U.S. financial 
system stood on the verge of collapse. This financial crisis quickly spilled over to other 
industries further weakening the U.S. economy.  
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The real estate investment trust (REIT) industry did not stand unaffected from this 
economic disaster. REITs experienced a liquidity crisis as a consequence of the credit crunch 
that loomed in the financial industry during the period from 2008Q4 to 2009Q2 (Case et al., 
2012). Since government regulations constrain REITs’ ability to retain their net income through 
minimum dividend payment requirements, they must have access to funds either through capital 
markets, debt markets, or banks in order to grow. The REIT industry experienced significant 
erosion in its equity and debt capital raising abilities during this period. At the same time, bank 
lending came to a near halt making liquid funds a scarce resource for borrowers including those 
linked to the REIT industry. Bank funding primarily through credit line facilities is important 
since it provides REIT managers with leeway in their capital structure decisions and with the 
flexibility to utilize this source rather than the capital markets during unfavorable times. With 
REIT retained earnings representing a marginal funding source of new investments in the 
industry, it is plausible that a fall out in liquidity from traditional sources would place significant 
pressure on REITs’ ability to operate effectively. The changes in market conditions and REITs 
mandatory minimum dividend payment structure serve to motive this paper. 
As market conditions deteriorated during the crisis, investors were pressed to take 
financial decisions under uncertainty and pressure. The events in the midst of the financial crisis 
and the market turmoil led to increased volatility in measures of institutional and individual 
investor sentiment. The increase in volatility is important since a body of literature has 
documented a relationship between investor sentiment and the formation and volatility of asset 
prices including REIT prices. Our research is further motivated by the noise trader risk theory 
which posits that security prices suffer deviations from intrinsic values due to noise introduced 
by the herding trading behavior of investors trading on non-fundamental information (De Long 
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et al., 1990). Interestingly, this increase in sentiment volatility is more evidently portrayed by 
changes in institutional investor sentiment which are usually less volatile compared to changes in 
individual investor sentiment. For the period from December 2001 to February 2013, sentiment 
volatility is markedly higher after the second quarter of 2007. Exhibit 1 shows the changes in 
both individual and institutional investor sentiment for the sample period from December 2001 
to February 2013. In Exhibit 1, institutional investor sentiment realizes its lowest values after the 
beginning of the crisis denoting negative expectations during the crisis period. In contrast, 
changes in individual investor sentiment appear not to significantly react to the crisis period.  
In this paper, we assess whether REIT market returns and volatility were significantly 
affected by the 2008-2009 REIT liquidity crisis and test the role of investor sentiment on the 
REIT return generating process. This paper adds to the literature on the impact of the liquidity 
crisis on REIT sector returns and volatility and to the literature that examines the impact of 
investor sentiment on REIT returns. The pressure of the liquidity crunch on REIT prices and the 
influence that investor expectations had during the crisis has not been addressed. We provide 
evidence on the influence of sentiment on the REIT return generating process, especially during 
times of scarce financial liquidity and market turmoil. 
Overall, results from generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean 
models show that REIT returns decreased significantly while volatility increased significantly 
during the 2008Q4-2009Q2 liquidity crisis. Our results support behavioral hypotheses on the 
impact of sentiment on security prices (De Long et al., 1990; Barkham and Ward, 1999). In our 
results, investor sentiment is observed to play a significant role in both the formation and 
volatility of REIT prices. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of expectations from the 
heterogeneous REIT investor base by classifying sentiment from institutional and individual 
4 
 
investors independently. Institutional investor sentiment is observed to have a larger impact on 
REIT returns and volatility than individual investor sentiment. Previous research on the 
sentiment-return relationship in REITs undermines the influence that institutional ownership has 
on the REIT prices and uses the debatable closed-end fund discount as a proxy of investor 
sentiment (Lin et al., 2009).1 This paper fills a gap in the behavioral finance literature by 
providing evidence on the impact of investor sentiment on a highly regulated industry during 
times of market crisis. Our findings imply that investors may use bullish or bearish shifts in 
sentiment as a signal for capital allocations in the REIT market, especially from institutional 
investors who play a significant role in REIT price formation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
relevant literature and puts forth our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data employed in this 
study. Section 4 explains the methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 
6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Investor Sentiment 
A body of literature finds a significant relationship between investor sentiment and 
returns on diverse financial assets (i.e. Shiller, 1981; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lee et al., 
1991; Lee et al., 2002). Specifically, research in the REIT industry finds evidence that investor 
sentiment has a significant impact on REIT returns (Chan et al., 1990; Lin et al., 2009). The 
behaviorist approach to asset pricing suggests that although market prices are generally observed 
in equilibrium, noise trading can cause pronounced price deviations that arbitrage forces are 
unable to correct. This effect on prices intensifies in times of market turmoil and uncertainty 
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when sentiment dominates the market given generalized negative expectations about 
performance. Despite the evidence, no preceding research explores the sentiment-return 
relationship in the REIT industry during times of financial turmoil nor do they directly test the 
noise trader hypothesis by considering institutional (sophisticated investor) and individual (noise 
trader) sentiment simultaneously in a pricing model as proposed by DeLong et al. (1990).  
Using the index of industrial confidence produced by the Confederation of British 
Industry, the index of consumer confidence produced by the Gallup Polling Organization and the 
index of inflation expectations produced by Money Market International as proxies for investor 
sentiment, Barkham and Ward (1999) test the noise trader hypothesis on listed property 
companies in the United Kingdom (U.K.). These authors explain that there are two fundamental 
types of market participants: “rational participants” that trade on assumptions formed by 
unbiased estimates of economic and financial fundamentals and “noise traders” that trade on 
pseudo-signals and sentiment. They find that U.K. property companies often trade at a discount 
with respect to their net asset value (NAV) and argue that that this deviation in price can be 
attributed to unpredictable changes in noise trader sentiment. This evidence suggests that pricing 
errors can be driven by noise traders although underlying assets in real estate companies are 
tangible and arguably easier to value compared to other types of assets. The noise trader risk 
hypothesis has been widely tested in the finance literature and findings show strong support for 
the theory. Lee et al. (2002) posit that noise trader risk is a systematic risk factor that should not 
be dismissed when modelling returns and volatility of financial securities. However, research has 
widely overlooked how the noise trader hypothesis could play a role in REIT price formation. 
Based on evidence of increased institutional ownership in REITs in recent years, we 
hypothesize that institutional investor sentiment has a significant impact on the REIT return 
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generating process while changes in individual investor sentiment should not be a significant 
determinant of REIT returns and volatility during the REIT liquidity crisis. Devos et al. (2012) 
point out that aggregate institutional holdings peaked at the beginning of 2008 at 58% ownership 
and declined to 50% ownership in the second quarter of 2009. Correspondingly, Striewe et al. 
(2013) explain that the general trend of REIT institutional ownership is positive with a 
significant decline only observed in 2008 and 2009. They report that, on average, 56.8% of REIT 
shares are held by institutions in the period from 1998 to 2010. This evidence of significant 
institutional ownership potentially diminishes the impact of individual investor sentiment on 
REIT returns. Moreover, as previously pointed out, changes in individual investor sentiment 
seem more erratic and responded less to the crisis compared to changes in institutional investor 
sentiment, providing more support to our hypothesis that institutional investor sentiment may 
influence REIT prices more than individual sentiment. Given that large institutional investors 
have sizeable capital and frequently trade in blocks that are large enough to influence REIT 
industry returns, it is expected that institutions will influence prices in the REIT market more 
than individuals. 
 
2.2 The REIT liquidity crisis 
REITs are a unique type of firm that are constrained by government regulation to payout 
90 percent or more their net income. This characteristic limits their ability to fund new property 
development or major property acquisitions using internally-generated funds (Hardin and Hill, 
2011). Ott et al. (2005) explain that retained earnings are the identified funding source for only 
7% of new REIT investments. Thus, REITs must tap the capital markets or obtain financing from 
financial institutions in order to grow and operate. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, capital 
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markets behaved erratically and created shocks to firms dependent on external capital flows to 
fund operations (Case et al., 2012). The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT) reports that during the REIT liquidity crisis (2008Q4 to 2009Q2) equity REITs raised 
$960.12 million via seasoned equity offerings compared to $7,580.71 million raised in the 
preceding three quarters. Similarly, equity REITs raised $2,393.30 million via debt offerings 
during the crisis compared to $5,172.50 million during the preceding three quarters before the 
liquidity crisis.2 These figures illustrate the erosion in capital raising abilities by REITs during 
the liquidity crunch. 
Ott et al. (2005) highlight the importance of lines of credit to finance growth and to serve 
as backup liquidity to fund any cash shortages given the stringent REIT dividend payout policy. 
Lines of credit (credit commitments) are contracts that allow REITs to access funds regardless of 
the prevailing state of the market at the time of the request and serve as financial slack for REITs 
(Ooi et al., 2012). 3 To illustrate the importance of credit commitments to the REIT industry, 
unused credit line balances in proportion to credit lines plus cash for REITs represents close to 
74% of total liquidity compared to 45% for firms in other industries (Ooi et al., 2012). Credit line 
facilities allow borrowing only when and as needed and provide REITs important support to 
survive adverse economic conditions without committing to long-term financing. For these 
reasons, credit lines are believed to reduce REIT cost of capital and to increase firm value 
(Hardin and Hill, 2011). Unfortunately, the financial crisis severely constrained bank lending; 
bank balance sheet erosion (and the liquidity hoarding response) hindered banks’ capacity to 
fulfill credit line commitments and harshly deteriorated the flow of cash to the REIT industry 
leading to a liquidity crisis from 2008Q4 to 2009Q2 (Case et al., 2012). 
 
8 
 
3. Data 
 The sample period includes the latest business cycle as indicated by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) which spans from December 2001 to February 2013.4 Our 
sample covers a periods of expansion that includes the buildup of the housing bubble, subsequent 
bust, a full time span of the latest U.S financial crisis along with the REIT liquidity crisis, and 
the subsequent mild recovery period. The REIT liquidity crisis extends from October 2, 2008 to 
July 2, 2009 (Case et al., 2012). REIT returns are proxied by the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real 
Estate Index which reflects the returns of all U.S. tax-qualified equity REITs recognized by the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. We additionally test for robustness of the 
results employing the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Total Return index which takes into account dividend 
payments. 
 To proxy for investor sentiment, we employ survey-based weekly measures of sentiment 
compiled by the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and Investor’s Intelligence 
(II) following Brown and Cliff (2004). Individual investor sentiment is captured by a survey that 
is conducted by the AAII on a random sample of its members inquiring on their perception of 
market expectations for the following six months. The AAII labels each survey as bullish, 
bearish, or neutral. The individual sentiment index is constructed by calculating the difference 
between the percentage of bullish responses and bearish responses of the surveys (bull-bear 
spread). Institutional investor sentiment is built on a compilation of market performance 
expectations from investment advisory newsletters. These perceptions are labeled bullish, 
bearish, or hold depending on the recommendations from the advisors. The institutional 
sentiment index in this analysis is constructed by calculating the bull-bear spread from the 
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percentage of bullish newsletters with respect to the percentage of bearish newsletters. REIT 
index and investor sentiment data are retrieved from Thomson’s DataStream. 
We use the Fama and French (1992) factors and the default risk (DEF) and term structure 
premiums (PREM) as control variables. The Fama-French factors are obtained from Dr. Kenneth 
French’s website.5 DEF is the default risk premium defined by the difference between Moody’s 
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield and the Baa Corporate Bond Yield. PREM is the term risk 
premium constructed as difference between the 20-year Treasury bond rate and the one-month 
Treasury bill rate. The DEF and PREM factors are also constructed with data from Thomson’s 
DataStream. All data is in weekly frequency. 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Exhibit 2 presents the contemporaneous bivariate unconditional correlations for the 
variables employed in the empirical analysis. Besides the strong correlation between the two 
measures of REIT excess return, the highest correlation coefficients observed are between the 
excess return in the market (Rm-Rf) and the two measures of REIT excess returns. Due to the 
high correlation between excess NAREIT total and price returns, their corresponding pair-wise 
correlations with (Rm-Rf) are both 0.645. The sentiment indices ∆II and ∆AAII display a 
correlation of 0.195 which declines slightly to 0.144 during the REIT liquidity crisis. With the 
exception of the strong correlation between excess market returns (a control variable) and our 
two measures of REIT excess returns (our dependent variables), the low-to-moderate correlations 
help mitigate any potential multicollinearity issues that could impact our empirical 
specifications.  
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  Summary statistics are presented in Exhibit 3. As expected, weekly excess NAREIT total 
returns (mean of 0.251%) are on average larger than excess NAREIT price returns (mean of 
0.160%). It is central to recall that the total NAREIT index takes into account dividends which 
are an important source of income for investors making allocations in the REIT industry. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that both measures of NAREIT excess returns (price and total) 
are on average larger than the excess market returns (0.103%). This is consistent with claims 
from NAREIT of REIT over-performance with respect to the overall stock market and especially 
when dividends are accounted for (NAREIT, 2012). 
 Changes in individual investor sentiment, our ∆AAII variable, have a noticeably larger 
standard deviation of 15.042 when compared to changes in institutional investor sentiment, our 
∆II variable, which reflects a standard deviation of 4.908; furthermore, our individual investor 
sentiment variable also reflects larger magnitudes in minimum and maximum values during the 
entire sample period. During the liquidity crisis, the standard deviation of 1.678 for ∆II and 
4.654 for ∆AAII are considerably smaller with respect to the whole sample period; nonetheless, 
the standard deviation for ∆II is smaller compared to ∆AAII.  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. REIT industry returns and volatility 
Our first specification involves the estimation of the following generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity-in-mean (GARCH-M) to examine the impact of the liquidity crisis 
on REIT industry returns and conditional variance: 
(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡, (1) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜑3𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜑4ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜑5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡. (2) 
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The dependent variable (REIT-Rf)t in the mean equation corresponds to the FTSE NAREIT U.S. 
Real Estate Index excess returns. Crisist, which appears in the mean and the variance equations, 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the REIT liquidity crisis from October 2, 
2008 to July 2, 2009 and the value of 0 outside the crisis period. Notice that the conditional 
variance ℎ𝑡 modeled in equation 2, which captures contemporaneous realizations of volatility 
that is often observed to influence excess returns, enters the mean equation and its effect is 
captured by 𝛽2. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of N control variables that are expected to explain REIT industry 
excess returns and 𝜀𝑡 is the remainder stochastic term, assumed to follow a normal distribution. 
 The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the Fama-French three-factor model variables that consist of the 
excess returns of the market constructed as the value-weighted returns on all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate; SMBt (small minus big) as the average 
return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios for all 
stocks based on market capitalization; and HMLt (high minus low) as the average return on the 
two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios for all stocks based 
on the book-to-market ratio. Control variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 also include the Fama-French bond factors 
DEF and PREM. DEFt is the default risk premium defined as the difference between Moody’s 
Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield and the Baa Corporate Bond Yield. PREMt is the term risk 
premium constructed as the difference between the 20-year Treasury bond rate and the one-
month Treasury bill rate. Peterson and Hsieh (1997) address the appropriateness of the Fama-
French variables for REIT return models and find that equity REIT returns are affected by the 
market-to-book and size factors as suggested by Fama and French (1992) and by the bond 
market factors DEF and PREM (Fama and French, 1993). 
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 In the conditional variance modeled by equation 2, we have that 𝜀𝑡−1
2  captures the lagged 
squared innovations from equation 1. With persistent volatility we expect 𝜑2 to be statistically 
significant (i.e. the current value of the variance of the errors depends on the realized 𝜀𝑡−1
2 ). 𝐼𝑡−1 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if lagged shocks are positive (i.e. 𝜀𝑡−1 ≥ 0) and 0 if lagged 
shocks are negative. Hence, the  𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 term captures the Glosten et al. (1993) threshold 
ARCH (TARCH) asymmetric effect of shocks on volatility. We expect the TARCH coefficient 
𝜑3 to be negative since positive shocks are observed to cause a downward revision in conditional 
variance (Lee et al., 2002). ℎ𝑡−1 are t-1 realizations of conditional variance to account for 
additional volatility persistence. Lastly, we include 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 in the variance equation as well to 
model not only its mean effects on excess returns but also its potential role on volatility. 
 Equations 1 and 2 are estimated jointly as a system of equations using maximum 
likelihood. The estimation follows the methods proposed in Engle (1982) who introduced the 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) to simultaneously model the mean and the 
conditional variance of a series. A more restrictive homoscedasticity assumption when modeling 
the returns of most financial assets is, more often than not, violated. The violation means that 
ordinary least squares is not efficient and usual inference procedures are not appropriate. 
Bollerslev (1986) extended the (ARCH) modeling process of Engle (1982) to a Generalized 
ARCH (GARCH) to allow the conditional variance to be dependent upon previous own lags. 
GARCH is typically preferred to ARCH as it is more parsimonious and less likely to breach non-
negativity constraints. We expect that this flexible modeling strategy captures the periods of 
unusual large volatility in REITs that come as a response to continuously fluctuating market 
conditions. We additionally include two extensions to the methods proposed by Bollerslev. First, 
in keeping with basic theory of asset markets we employ a GARCH-M to assess if the return's 
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conditional variance affects excess returns. The basic premise is that risk-averse agents will 
require compensation for holding risky assets. Second, we model a differentiated effect of 
positive and negative innovations on conditional volatility. 
 Similar specifications to model first and second moments of REIT returns have been used 
in empirical research. Papers that examine the relationship between the volatility of different 
assets classes and REITs make a strong argument on the appropriateness of GARCH-M to model 
REIT returns given the concern of heteroscedasticity (Cotter and Stevenson, 2006; and 
Stevenson, 2002). 
  
4.2. The roles of the liquidity crisis and investor sentiment  
The analysis of the role of investor sentiment on REIT returns and volatility during the 
REIT liquidity crisis begins by examining whether investor sentiment is a significant factor in 
modeling REIT returns and volatility during the sample period investigated (December 2001 to 
February 2013). We propose the following augmented GARCH-M model: 
(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 (3) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜑3𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜑4ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜑5∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑6∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡 (4) 
 
in which (REIT-Rf)t in the mean equation 3 are the FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real Estate Index excess 
returns, ℎ𝑡 are contemporaneous realizations of the conditional variance and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
control variables as described in the previous section. ∆𝐼𝐼 and ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 are changes in institutional 
and individual investor sentiment respectively to test for the impact of changes in sentiment on 
REIT excess returns. The conditional variance equation includes ARCH, TARCH, and GARCH 
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terms consistent with equation 2 along with changes in institutional and individual investor 
sentiment ∆𝐼𝐼 and ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼. 
 To test whether changes in sentiment have a differentiated effect on REIT returns and 
volatility during crisis and non-crisis periods, we augment the GARCH-M model with an 
interaction between the change in sentiment for institutional and individual investors and the 
dummy variable 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡. The resulting model takes the following form: 
(𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 (5) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜑3𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜑4ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜑5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ ∆𝐼𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑6𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ ∆𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑡 (6) 
 
in which the mean includes contemporaneous realizations of conditional variance ℎ𝑡, changes in 
institutional and individual investor sentiment during the crisis Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt 
respectively and a vector of control variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as described previously. (REIT-Rf)t are the FTSE 
NAREIT U.S. Real Estate Index excess returns. Consistent with the previous models, the 
conditional variance includes ARCH, TARCH, and GARCH terms and the two interactions of 
the dummy Crisist and changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment: Crisist*∆IIt and 
Crisist*∆AAIIt respectively. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. The liquidity crisis and REIT returns and volatility 
 The estimation results for the models in equations 1 and 2 are presented in Exhibit 4. 
Model 1 shows that the contemporaneous volatility ht has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on REIT excess returns; this statistical relationship holds for both REIT return indices 
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(i.e. the price and total REIT return index). These results are consistent with the orthodox risk-
return investment relationship which posits that higher risk, proxied by volatility in this case, 
commands higher returns.  
The statistically significant negative coefficients on the liquidity crisis (Crisist) dummy 
variable in the mean equation (-8.080 on the model based on excess NAREIT price returns and -
7.829 on the model examining excess total returns) provide evidence that excess returns 
significantly deteriorated during the REIT liquidity crisis period. The results would suggest that 
investors may have rebalanced their portfolios towards lower risk investments and away from 
riskier type asset classes thus sacrificing potential return for safety and liquidity. These results 
support evidence of REIT investors displaying a “flight to quality” during the economic crisis 
(Devos et al., 2012). The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the liquidity crisis 
dummy variable in the conditional variance equation in Model 1 suggests that volatility 
significantly rose during the liquidity crisis period. As uncertainty increased and the REIT 
industry experienced liquidity constraints, REIT industry returns experienced higher volatility as 
a reflection of negative expectations regarding future market performance. This finding supports 
the view of the importance of REITs access to liquidity either through capital markets or bank 
facilities to operate effectively. The results also suggest that the absence of these liquidity 
sources is viewed unfavorably by investors. As expected, 𝜀𝑡−1
2 shows positive and statistically 
significant coefficients (0.201 for REIT price returns and 0.202 for REIT total returns) implying 
that conditional variance heavily depends on prior squared shocks in the mean equation. 
Negative and statistically significant coefficients for the TARCH term 𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 show that 
negative shocks have a larger impact on volatility than do positive ones, portraying the 
asymmetric effect of shocks on conditional variance suggested by Glosten et al. (1993). 
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Additionally, consistent with Bollerslev (1986), ht-1 shows positive and statistically significant 
coefficients (0.754 for the model based on REIT price returns and 0.750 for the model that 
examines REIT total returns) suggesting a relatively high volatility persistence. 
 Model 2 in Exhibit 4 expands Model 1 by incorporating the Fama-French three-factor 
model as a vector of control variables in the mean equation. The coefficients for all three Fama-
French equity factors are positive and significant. Moreover, the Crisist variable continues to 
explain REIT returns and volatility based on the negative and statistically significant coefficients 
in the mean equation (-7.433 for REIT price returns model and -7.458 for REIT total returns 
model) and the positive and statistically significant coefficients in the conditional variance 
equation (2.492 for REIT price returns model and 2.490 for REIT total returns model).  
 Model 3 in Exhibit 4 modifies our benchmark model of equations 1 and 2 by including 
the Fama-French bond factors DEFt and PREMt in the vector of controls 𝑋𝑖𝑡. The results in 
Model 3 suggest that bond factors do not significantly explain the observed time series variation 
in REIT excess returns suggesting that REITs behave more like equity securities rather than 
fixed-income securities during our sample period. These findings are consistent with Boudry et 
al. (2012) that observe REITs behaving more like equity rather than fixed-income securities and 
unsecuritized real estate in the short-run. The Crisist coefficients remain statistically significant 
implying that the crisis plays an important role in modeling REIT excess returns and volatility 
even after controlling for the Fama-French bond factors. 
 Model 4 in Exhibit 4 shows the results for the comprehensive model that includes the 
entire set of control variables in addition to the REIT liquidity crisis dummy variable. The results 
robustly show that the coefficients on Crisist have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant under various model specifications in both the mean and conditional variance 
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equations. Moreover, REIT excess returns are significantly lower during the liquidity crisis 
period confirming deterioration in market conditions. The substantial decrease in returns is 
accompanied by increased volatility in the REIT market during the liquidity crisis providing 
evidence of higher risk and uncertainty for REITs. Evidence suggests that REIT impaired access 
to liquid funds led to uncertainty regarding the true market value of REIT assets and their 
capacity to produce cash flows. 
 
5.2. Investor sentiment and the liquidity crisis 
 We initially explore the impact of changes in investor sentiment on REIT returns for the 
sample period that spans from December 2001 to February 2013. The sample period selected 
begins after the 2001 recession to evaluate only the effect of the 2008-2009 REIT liquidity crisis. 
The estimation results for the specifications in equations 3 and 4 are presented in Models 1 and 2 
of Exhibit 5. Overall, results show that changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment 
significantly impact REIT excess returns. Specifically, as portrayed in Model 1, changes in 
sentiment are positive and significant in modeling REIT excess returns although changes in 
institutional investor sentiment (∆II) appear to have a larger effect than changes in individual 
investor sentiment (∆AAII), even after factoring that the standard deviation of ∆AAII is much 
larger than of ∆II. Changes in both institutional and individual investor sentiment show a 
negative relationship with volatility. This effect is larger in magnitude for changes in institutional 
investor sentiment in comparison to changes in individual investor sentiment. These findings 
remain qualitatively unchanged whether we are modeling REIT excess price returns or REIT 
excess total returns.  
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Model 2 shows that the effect of sentiment on returns remains positive and statistically 
significant when we include the vector of control variables in the model. ∆II displays a 
coefficient of 0.065 significant at the 1% level while ∆AAII has a smaller coefficient of 0.011 
significant at the 5% level. The dominance of ∆II is not surprising given the increased levels of 
institutional ownership in the REIT industry and predominant institutional investor market 
power. In the conditional variance equation in Model 2, it is worthy to point out that after 
including the ARCH, TARCH, and GARCH terms, the impact of ∆AAII becomes statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the estimates on ∆II are robust to this specification suggesting 
that changes in institutional investor sentiment have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on REIT volatility. Positive changes in institutional investor sentiment are associated 
with reductions in volatility. An interpretation to our findings is that as institutional investors 
turn bullish, they tend to hold REITs especially since REIT investors not only purchase this type 
of equity for the price appreciation but for the steady stream of dividends; however, as sentiment 
turns bearish, probably as a consequence of negative market outlooks, investors will actively 
rebalance their portfolios leading to increased volatility. Overall, the results in Exhibit 5 suggest 
that investor sentiment is a significant factor in explaining REIT returns during the sample period 
from December 2001 to February 2013. 
We next examine the impact of changes in sentiment during the 2008-2009 liquidity 
crisis. The estimation results for the model in equations 5 and 6 are presented in Exhibit 6. 
Model 1 shows the estimates that include the Fama-French framework as controls along with the 
interactions Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt in the mean equation. The conditional variance 
equation includes Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt in conjunction with ARCH, TARCH, and 
GARCH terms. The results for REIT excess price and total returns are congruent. The findings 
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indicate that during the liquidity crisis ∆II significantly impacts REIT excess returns whereas 
∆AAII does not. These results differ from the previous analysis that included the entire sample 
period which indicates that both individual and institutional investor sentiment influence returns. 
Our results suggest that sentiment from individual investors were either too erratic, meaning that 
sentiment from bullish and bearish individuals cancelled each other out and thus no impact was 
observed, or that institutional investors were the only ones with sufficient market power to 
influence returns during the liquidity crisis. As expected, all three Fama-French equity factors 
are positive and statistically significant. In the conditional variance equation, results show that 
institutional investor sentiment (∆IIt) is negatively and significantly related to volatility whereas 
individual investor sentiment (∆AAIIt ) is not a significant factor in explaining volatility during 
the liquidity crisis. The TARCH term in the conditional variance equation is not statistically 
significant suggesting that there is no asymmetric effect in lagged 𝜀𝑡
2 (i.e. lagged squared shocks 
have the same effect whether there are positive or negative shocks to excess returns in the mean 
equation). 
Model 2 in Exhibit 6 expands the model by including the complete vector of control 
variables. Our previous results remain materially unchanged. The Fama-French bond factors are 
not significant whereas equity factors are all positive and statistically significant. Institutional 
investor sentiment appears to positively influence REIT returns and negatively impact volatility 
as in the prior model during the liquidity crisis. Overall, these results suggest that although 
investor sentiment plays a significant role in the REIT return and volatility generation process, 
institutional investors exhibit a greater influence in the REIT industry compared to individual 
investors during the liquidity crisis. This may suggest that during the crisis period, noise traders’ 
role in REIT asset price formation is dampened by institutional investor sentiment and that REIT 
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price formation may be driven more by fundamentals if we accept that institutional sentiment is 
driven by rational expectations as suggested by Barkham and Ward (1999). 
 
5.3. Augmented Model 
We augment the GARCH-M model to simultaneously include ∆IIt and ∆AAIIt for the 
complete sample period along with the interactions Crisist*∆IIt and Crisist*∆AAIIt in both the 
mean and conditional variance equations. The idea is to test whether the sentiment coefficients 
during the liquidity crisis remain robust with the inclusion of sentiment for the entire sample 
period. The results are reported in Model 3, Exhibit 6, which are consistent with the findings 
presented in the preceding sections. The maximum likelihood estimates imply dominance of 
changes in institutional investor sentiment over individual investor sentiment; moreover, changes 
in institutional investor sentiment display a coefficient of significantly greater magnitude during 
the REIT liquidity crisis compared to the rest of the sample period. This implies that although 
institutional investor sentiment significantly impacts returns during the entire sample period, 
changes in institutional investor sentiment played a larger and more important role during the 
crisis. On the other hand, changes in individual investor sentiment appear only marginally 
significant for excess NAREIT price returns in Model 3 though this significance dissipates in the 
model for excess NAREIT total returns.  
In the case of the conditional variance equation in Model 3 of Exhibit 6, both ∆IIt and 
∆AAIIt exhibit a negative relationship with volatility, however, the magnitude of the coefficients 
for ∆IIt are larger in magnitude (-0.215 for excess price returns and -0.215 for excess total 
returns) in comparison to ∆AAIIt (-0.031 for excess price returns and -0.0374 for excess total 
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returns). Model 4 provides additional robustness checks showing estimates that are consistent in 
signs and magnitude with the previously reported specifications.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 The unique dividend policy restrictions of the REIT industry constrain these firms to hold 
a diminutive portion of income in retained earnings. This dividend policy restriction forces 
REITs to fund new investments by raising cash through costly debt or equity issuance or by 
relying on credit commitments from banks and other financial institutions. Research finds that 
the latter option is preferable since credit lines serve as financial slack for REITs and do not 
impact their capital structure (Ooi et al., 2012). Credit commitments function as cash reserves for 
REITs which accounts for close to 74% of total liquidity in this industry in comparison to 45% 
registered by firms in general. In summary, credit commitments represent a vital component of 
REIT operations and may serve as an indication of REIT financial health. 
 The 2007-2009 financial crisis triggered market turmoil that had major negative 
consequences on the U.S. economy. The financial sector was especially affected by this crisis, 
some banks failed and market conditions did not begin to settle until the federal government 
intervened. The REIT industry was not immune from this financial disaster. The financial crisis 
severely constrained banks, and other financial institutions, eroding their capacity to fulfill credit 
commitments to REITs. The diminished flow of cash to the REIT industry led to a severe 
liquidity crisis that spanned from 2008Q4 to 2009Q2. 
 In this paper we estimated various GARCH specifications to find strong empirical 
evidence that the liquidity crisis had a statistically significant negative effect on REIT excess 
returns. Moreover we also find that the liquidity crisis helped explain the significant increase in 
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market volatility. We argue that as liquid funds became scarce, growth and expansion 
opportunities diminished and REIT overall financial heath was adversely affected. The REIT 
industry outlook was negative and uncertainty flooded the market. Investors in an attempt to 
rebalance their portfolios in response to the crisis, created increased volatility during these 
troubled times. 
 According to the behavioral finance viewpoint, asset pricing is affected not only by 
economic fundamentals but also by investor sentiment. Bullish investors who have positive 
market expectations will affect security prices given their trading patterns; on the other hand, 
bearish investor trading will also pressure prices. Research in the REIT industry finds that 
investor sentiment is a significant factor in explaining REIT returns and volatility; this paper 
explores the relationship between investor sentiment and REIT returns and volatility during the 
period spanning from the 2001 recession to February 2013 with a focus on the REIT liquidity 
crisis of 2008-2009.  
Our results are consistent with behavioral finance explanations. We find that investor 
sentiment is a significant factor in explaining REIT returns and volatility during the relevant 
sample period. Specifically, both institutional and individual investor sentiment were found to 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on returns, however, the point estimates on the 
institutional investor sentiment were consistently larger than the individual investor sentiment. 
Similarly, the analysis shows that the institutional and individual investor sentiment both have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on volatility. Interestingly, while sentiment from these 
two markedly different groups of investors are relevant in explaining REIT returns and volatility, 
sentiment for institutional investors dominates the effects. 
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The results additionally provide strong evidence that sentiment plays an important role 
during the REIT liquidity crisis. While the results consistently indicate that institutional investor 
sentiment is a significant factor affecting excess returns during the crisis, individual investor 
sentiment was no longer significant. A plausible explanation can be derived from the large 
increase in institutional holdings in the REIT industry. According to Striewe et al. (2013), 
aggregate institutional ownership is recorded at an average of 56.8% of shares outstanding for 
the period 1998-2010. Furthermore, institutional investors with sizeable capital have sufficient 
market power to influence industry returns which is clearly not the case for individual investors. 
Finally, this paper additionally contributes by providing evidence on the relevance of 
investor sentiment in the REIT industry. In particular, investors should pay close attention to 
changes in institutional investor sentiment especially during times of market turmoil. Overall, the 
results suggest that positive (negative) changes in aggregate sentiment will affect REIT returns 
positively (negatively) and volatility negatively (positively). Investors may use sentiment as a 
signal for capital allocation. These findings offer support to the field of behavioral finance by 
highlighting the influence that investor perception and expectations can have on the market. 
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Exhibit 1. Changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment 
 
 
Notes: These graphs show changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment from Investor’s Intelligence (II) 
and the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII), respectively, for the time period from the end of the 
2001 recession in December 2001 to February 2013. The REIT liquidity crisis extends from October 2, 2008 to July 
2, 2009.
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Exhibit 2. Correlation table  
 
 
Exss REIT 
Price Ret 
Exss REIT 
Total Ret 
Crisis* 
∆AAII 
Crisis*∆II Crisis ∆AAII ∆II Rm-Rf SMB HML DEF PREM 
Exss REIT 
Price Ret 
1.000            
Exss REIT 
Total Ret 
0.999 1.000           
Crisis* 
∆AAII 
0.289 0.289 1.000          
Crisis*∆II 0.208 0.209 0.144 1.000         
Crisis -0.091 -0.088 0.007 0.098 1.000        
∆AAII 0.186 0.184 0.310 0.045 0.003 1.000       
∆II 0.284 0.284 0.049 0.342 0.035 0.195 1.000      
Rm-Rf 0.645 0.645 0.215 0.181 -0.061 0.172 0.382 1.000     
SMB 0.208 0.208 -0.020 0.067 -0.005 0.054 0.170 0.224 1.000    
HML 0.481 0.481 0.295 0.100 -0.108 0.067 0.077 0.309 0.004 1.000   
DEF -0.036 -0.033 0.012 0.159 0.860 0.015 0.066 -0.014 0.014 -0.061 1.000  
PREM 0.024 0.026 0.006 0.009 0.179 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.064 0.023 0.266 1.000 
 
Notes: This table shows the correlation matrix for the variables employed. Excess NAREIT Price Returns are the weekly REIT industry price returns minus the 
risk-free rate. Excess NAREIT Total Returns are the REIT industry total returns minus the risk-free rate, total returns account for dividend payments. The Crisis 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 during the REIT liquidity crisis (October 2, 2008 to July2, 2009) and 0 otherwise. The interactions Crisis*∆II and 
Crisis*∆AAII represent changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment during the crisis, respectively. ∆II and ∆AAII are changes in institutional and 
individual investor sentiment, respectively. Rm-Rf, SMB and HML are the Fama-French equity factors while DEF and PREM are the Fama-French bond factors. 
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Exhibit 3. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Excess NAREIT Price Returns (%) 582 0.160 3.986 -32.461 35.106 
Excess NAREIT Total Returns (%) 582 0.251 3.990 -32.424 35.159 
Crisis (dummy) 585 0.068 0.253 0.000 1.000 
Crisis*∆AAII 585 0.009 4.654 -33.380 44.310 
Crisis*∆II 584 0.044 1.678 -14.200 17.200 
∆AAII 585 -0.061 15.042 -56.900 50.750 
∆II 584 0.017 4.908 -17.500 18.100 
Rm-Rf (%) 582 0.103 2.626 -18.000 12.610 
SMB 582 0.074 1.182 -3.870 3.660 
HML 582 0.062 1.267 -7.000 7.600 
DEF 585 1.180 0.506 0.599 3.460 
PREM 584 2.791 1.405 -0.230 4.540 
Notes: Excess NAREIT Price Returns are the weekly REIT industry price returns minus the risk-free rate. Excess 
NAREIT Total Returns are the REIT industry total returns minus the risk-free rate, total returns account for dividend 
payments. The Crisis dummy variable takes the value of 1 during the REIT liquidity crisis (October 2, 2008 to 
July2, 2009) and 0 otherwise. The interactions Crisis*∆II and Crisis*∆AAII represent changes in institutional and 
individual investor sentiment during the crisis, respectively. ∆II and ∆AAII are changes in institutional and 
individual investor sentiment, respectively. Rm-Rf, SMB and HML are the Fama-French equity factors and DEF and 
PREM are the Fama-French bond factors. 
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Exhibit 4. Effect of REIT liquidity crisis on REIT excess returns and volatility 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
 Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Mean Equation          
Parameters         
α0 -0.032 0.071 -0.582** -0.506** 0.301 0.355 -0.287 -0.252 
ht 0.048** 0.046** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.056** 0.053** 0.153*** 0.156*** 
Crisist -8.080*** -7.829*** -7.433*** -7.458*** -8.281*** -8.028*** -7.038*** -7.116*** 
Rm-Rft   0.629*** 0.630***   0.629*** 0.631*** 
SMBt   0.352*** 0.357***   0.355*** 0.359*** 
HMLt   0.557*** 0.556***   0.556*** 0.556*** 
DEFt     -0.507 -0.467 -0.433 -0.409 
PREMt     0.051 0.055 0.047 0.052 
Volatility Equation         
Parameters         
φ1 -0.328 -0.327 -0.091 -0.081 -0.322 -0.315 -0.123 -0.103 
𝜀𝑡−1
2  0.201*** 0.202*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 
𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 -0.132** -0.125** -0.162*** -0.157*** -0.142*** -0.135** -0.167*** -0.161*** 
ℎ𝑡−1 0.754*** 0.750*** 0.712*** 0.711*** 0.760*** 0.756*** 0.718*** 0.716*** 
Crisist 3.370*** 3.386*** 2.492*** 2.490*** 3.360*** 3.370*** 2.491*** 2.483*** 
 
Model 
Diagnostics 
        
Log-likelihood -1428.11 -1429.05 -1307.76 -1308.14 -1427.37 -1428.36 -1306.84 -1307.25 
Wald χ2 10.44*** 9.65*** 477.58*** 475.96*** 13.30*** 12.34*** 485.79*** 483.45*** 
N 582 582 582 582 582 582 582 582 
Notes: This table reports the results for the GARCH-M model described by equations 1 and 2 in the methodology section. Each model has two columns: one 
reports the results for excess NAREIT price returns and the other for excess NAREIT total returns. The Wald’s test checks for model parameter restrictions under 
the null that our set of parameters is equal to zero; the Wald’s test statistic is Chi-square distributed. Sample period is from December 2001 to February 2013. *, 
** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.
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Exhibit 5. GARCH-M results. Impact of changes in institutional and individual investor 
sentiment on REIT excess returns and volatility.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
 Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
α0 0.157 0.247 0.286 -0.067 
ht   0.048* 0.024 
Rm-Rft   0.564** 0.557*** 
SMBt   0.358*** 0.345*** 
HMLt   0.504*** 0.481*** 
DEFt   -0.500  
PREMt   0.021  
∆IIt 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 
∆AAIIt 0.026*** 0.026** 0.011** 0.011** 
     
φ1 2.612*** 2.616*** -1.429*** -1.436*** 
𝜀𝑡−1
2    0.179*** 0.176*** 
𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1   -0.182*** -0.170*** 
ℎ𝑡−1   0.825*** 0.819*** 
∆IIt -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.243*** -0.250*** 
∆AAIIt -0.003** -0.002** -0.007 -0.010 
     
Log-likelihood -1585.82 -1586.99 -1304.63 -1305.80 
Wald χ2 60.69*** 60.09*** 375.85*** 346.09*** 
N 582 582 582 582 
Notes: This table reports the results for the GARCH-M model described by equations 3 and 4 in the methodology 
section of the paper. Results are for the sample period from December 2001 to February 2013. Each model has two 
columns: one that reports results based on for excess NAREIT price returns and the other that uses excess NAREIT 
total returns, respectively The Wald’s test checks for model parameter restrictions under the null that our set of 
parameters is equal to zero; the Wald’s test statistic is Chi-square distributed. *, ** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 
10% significance level respectively. 
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Exhibit 6. GARCH-M Results. Impact of changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment during the REIT liquidity crisis on 
REIT excess returns and volatility.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
 Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Price Returns 
Excess NAREIT 
Total Returns 
α0 0.101 0.190 0.336 0.365 0.411 0.452 0.321 0.288 
ht -0.006 -0.005 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 
Rm-Rft 0.596*** 0.597*** 0.598*** 0.599*** 0.535*** 0.538*** 0.546*** 0.537*** 
SMBt 0.347*** 0.350*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.350*** 0.353*** 0.314*** 0.333*** 
HMLt 0.513*** 0.519** 0.513*** 0.513*** 0.425*** 0.422*** 0.496*** 0.497*** 
DEFt   -0.386 -0.327 -0.375 -0.336 -0.308 -0.220 
PREMt   0.044 0.047 0.031 0.036 0.041 0.040 
Crisist*∆IIt 0.519** 0.519** 0.538*** 0.535** 0.497** 0.499**   
Crisist*∆AAIIt 0.037 0.039 0.036 0.038 0.023 0.026   
∆IIt     0.047** 0.043** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
∆AAIIt     0.010* 0.009 0.017*** 0.015*** 
         
φ1 -0.677** -0.686* -0.630* -0.647* -1.362*** -1.384*** -0.336 -0.719** 
𝜀𝑡−1
2  0.137*** 0.127*** 0.155*** 0.139*** 0.086*** 0.075** 0.217*** 0.160*** 
𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑡−1 -0.069 -0.055 -0.094 -0.074 -0.079* -0.068 -0.107 -0.072 
ℎ𝑡−1 0.786*** 0.790*** 0.777*** 0.783*** 0.835*** -0.034** 0.681*** 0.768*** 
Crisist*∆IIt -0.422*** -0.424*** -0.412*** -0.417*** -0.247*** -0.250*** -0.205*** -0.421*** 
Crisist*∆AAIIt -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 0.010 0.014 -0.132*** 0.036 
∆IIt     -0.215*** -0.215***   
∆AAIIt     -0.031** -0.034**   
         
Log-likelihood -1305.47 -1305.40 -1304.86 -1304.88 -1289.00 -1289.09 -1300.99 -1302.11 
Wald χ2 357.74*** 355.25*** 360.21*** 353.78*** 322.59*** 321.97*** 419.23*** 365.85*** 
N 582 582 582 582  582 582 582 582 
Notes: This table reports the results for the GARCH-M model described by equations 5 and 6 in the methodology section of the paper. Model 1 and 2 include the 
interactions Crisis*∆II and Crisis*∆AAII which represent changes in institutional and individual investor sentiment during the REIT liquidity crisis, respectively.  
Augmented models 3 and 4 additionally include ∆II and ∆AAII for the entire sample period. Each model has two columns that show results for excess NAREIT 
price returns and excess NAREIT total returns, respectively. *, ** and *** represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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1 Chen et al. (1993) and Elton et al. (1998) contest the closed-end fund discount as a proxy of investor sentiment that 
solely reflects individual investor sentiment arguing that there is empirical evidence that institutional holdings may 
be a factor that contributes to these discounts. Thus, closed-end fund discounts fail to make a proper distinction 
between sentiment derived from individuals and institutional investors 
2 Data on REIT capital offerings is found at the NAREIT website: https://www.reit.com/data-research/data/reit-
capital-offerings. Accessed on October 12, 2015. 
3 The credit commitment insurance hypothesis argues that the aggregate level of loan commitments are less 
susceptible to changes in the credit market conditions compared to a term or spot loans that are arranged as and 
when a firm needs funding from the bank (Sofianos et al., 1990; Morgan, 1998). Only under a materially adverse 
change in condition (e.g. a breach of financial covenants) as established in the loan commitment contract may the 
lender reduce or refuse to fulfill a request for funds (Ooi et al., 2012). 
4 Accessed at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html on April 24, 2013. 
5 Accessed on November 29, 2013. http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
                                                          
